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I. INTRODUCTION  
1. PURPOSE OF THE STUDY AND RESEARCH QUESTION 
 
Algeria which played, just after the independence, a pioneering role in serving just 
causes and liberation movements in the third world continues to carry great weight 
in the promotion of peace and reconciliation. Algeria has always promoted peace, 
stability and cooperation in the region of the Maghreb, Mediterranean, Sahel-
Saharan area, Africa and the Arab World. 
 
Mediation appears as a central pillar of Algerian diplomacy and its foreign policy. 
The active attitude, which is the matter of Algeria to occupy the role of "net 
exporter of peace", is a fact showing this place occupied by mediation in the 
external action of Algeria. Today, it is worth to Algeria to be a key player on the 
diplomatic scene of peace. 
 
The main purpose of this thesis is to understand the real potential of Algerian 
mediation in the pacific settlement of conflicts. At the end, the study must 
make it possible to know the causes of the success of the signing of the peace 
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agreements by the states in conflict under the aegis of Algeria and, to better 
understand the interests of Algeria in its implication in the resolution of these 
disputes. 
 
Alongside these topics, the following investigation will tackle the main question:  
 
What factors contributed to the success of the Algerian mediation approach to 
conflict resolution? 
 
In order to address this question, there are other sub research questions as follows: 
 
i. What is the specificity of the Algerian approach to peaceful conflict 
resolution through mediation? 
ii. What is the degree of involvement of Algerian diplomacy in promoting 
peace? 
iii. Are Algerian’s foreign policy principles a source of strength to resolve the 




2. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE TOPIC 
 
The importance of this study lies in the attempt to explain and understand 
international mediation, which is a particular modality for implementing conflict 
resolution policies. Especially since these are two types of conflicts: intrastate and 
interstate conflicts. On the academic level, it is a question of making our modest 
contribution to the understanding of a mechanism highly prized by the international 
community: a successful mediation by a state of middle power. 
 
3. DELIMITATION OF THE TOPIC 
 
Why Algeria ?  On the topic of mediation, the attention of analysts (scholars) and 
experts (diplomats) remains captivated by the role of traditional international actors 
such as great powers, international organizations (IO) and non-governmental 
organizations (charitable, religious, philanthropic). In other words, studies, relative 
to the role of small powers (or simply small states) and middle powers in the 
international management of conflicts through mediation, are very limited. For this 




Why mediation ? In the period 1945-90, there were 241 conflicts in the world of 
which 137 (57%) used a mediation process. 55% were a failure because without 
effects on the parties, 20.4% were partially successful in initiating negotiations, 
16.8% led to a ceasefire and only 7.8% to full settlement (Dieckhoff 2011, 14). 
Furthermore, two thirds of post Cold War conflicts have used mediation process to 
settle them (just one third between 1918 and 1996) (Ramsbotham and al. 2011, 
180).  Mediation appears as an adapted method of resolution of intra-state and 
interstate conflicts. Thus, international mediation is of real importance. Indeed, 
mediation processes can prevent the outbreak of a conflict or reduce its intensity, 
thereby limiting the intervention of forces on a foreign territory. 
 
Why 1975-2015 period? This study aims to cover the period from 1975 to 2015. 
The year 1975 is the decisive moment of the beginning of the first successful 
mediation. But I will cover, sometimes, certain events prior to the period chosen to 
understand the genesis of certain facts. The year of 2015, which is the date of the 
last conflict settled by an Algerian mediation, is essential to the extent that it will 
allow me to have a little perspective on events, as recommended by the method in 
5 
 
social sciences. Through this period, which includes 4 case studies, my objective is 
to establish, as far as possible, an exhaustive list of all the success factors of 
Algerian mediation. 
 
4. LITERATURE REVIEW  
 
First and in order to develop this topic, it is useful to understand the meaning of 
these key words: conflict, mediation, foreign policy, international negotiation, 
regional power, middle power. The literature is abundant on the clarification of 
these terms. 
 
Second, we will focus on the topics related and contribute directly to this research. 
Many contributions analyze the Algerian foreign policy:   
 
Daguzan (2015) gave an overview of Algerian foreign policy in its multilateral and 
bilateral dimension in the period 2000-2015. He asserts that Algerian foreign 
policy in its recent period is only an extension of the policy of the Boumediene 
years based on the principles defined under his leadership, and which are the 
6 
 
following: support for decolonization, non-intervention beyond borders, 
cooperation and multilateralism, liberation of Palestine; Western Sahara. He states 
that, the”Arab Spring, economic globalization, the economic and financial crisis,” 
now constrain Algeria “to redefine its strategic choices” to shape its foreign policy. 
In short, Algeria must make a vast review of its foreign policy. 
 
Hanzel (2015) gives a brief outline and succinct overview of the history of 
Algerian foreign policy, the elements that control the foreign policy making and, as 
a final point a comparison mainly with Morocco. He claims that the Algerian 
authorities have an intimidating mission to unite three aspects in Algerian politics: 
the military, the Islamists, and the civic associations and concluded that all these 
issues have their own position in determining the foreign policy. 
 
Chikhaoui (2015) approached the doctrinal principles of Algerian foreign policy 
and the historical context; Algeria's relationship with the Maghreb, Africa, the 
European Union, and the United States of America; at the end he examined 
Algeria's perspective for the development of its foreign policy. As a conclusion, the 
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author claims that in a new international context, Algeria has to revisit its foreign 
policy doctrine and assert itself in the face of new actors. 
Third, the complexity of conflicts and the growing interest in peaceful modes 
(mediation, conciliation ...) to their settlement, led to the multiplication of research 
efforts, justifying the wide range of hypotheses and explanatory factors for their 
success. Mediation in conflict has significant effects on countries in conflict with 
the gradual return of peace and security. 
 
Analysts have generally taken as indicators of success the ability of mediation to 
generate an agreement, reduce the occurrence of conflicts in the future, or reduce 
intensity. It is true that we should not consider these criteria alone, because certain 
elements are essential (such as the nature of the contact between the protagonists 
after the settlement of the conflict). 
 
A successful mediation is one that resolves a conflict and/or ends the dispute. 
Moreover, a conflict is resolved when its deep origins have been understood and 
made harmless. More clearly, an objective assessment of the success of mediation 
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could be based on criteria such as the reduction of violence, the reduction of the 
number of victims or the existence of dialogue between the parties. 
 
According to Lecoutre (2005) in his contribution on the mediation of the OAU in 
the conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea (1998-2000), he explains the success of 
this mediation by: the charisma of the Algerian president Bouteflika, the qualities 
that holds the latter and the credibility of Algeria. 
 
Allouche (1994), on the other hand, in his article on the mediation of small states, 
states that for a small state the defensive adaptation strategy is equivalent to 
insurance, to protection at a lower cost. 
 
In addition Dris-Aït Hamadouche (2013) in her reference to the case study on 
Algerian policy towards the conflict in Mali, she explains that the active foreign 
policy based on the multiplication of initiatives and constant commitment, 




These most important success factors will be repeated in this work, according to 
the link they have with the objective of my thesis, with a view to detailing them, 
adding the context of each mediation, foreign policy (practiced at each period 
level). The originality of my thesis lies in the fact that I will determine the other 
factors (geopolitical, economic, historical and cultural) of success for a country as 
middle power as a mediator. 
 
5. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
• The historical approach: I propose to refer to one theory: historical analysis. 
Essentially, I will use the historical approach as a guide to my analysis: 
historical causality is indicative of change, metamorphosis, creation or 
disappearance. As a result, the historical approach will be adapted to my 
analysis, as international mediation proves to be a predominant Algerian 
approach to external implications in conflicts. It becomes a historical fact that 
cannot escape a causal explanation of past and future events. It allows me to 
take a necessary step back to address the study of the resurgence of international 




• Data Collection: To accomplish the research objectives two data collection 
techniques were used to organize the present work. First, the empirical research, 
which consisted in observing the social fact based on interactions between 
Algerian actors involved in the mediation and reconciliation to settle conflicts. 
This is in particular by means of media (analysis of the speeches of the main 
actors). 
 
The consultation of the official documents of the Algerian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs will have helped me.  
 
Access to the documents of research centers giving special treatment to the 
problems of the North Africa sub-region in general and Algeria particularly has 
been invaluable to me, namely: The European Institute of the Mediterranean 
(IEMed), the French Institute of International Relations (IFRI) and the Arab World 




The use of secondary data such as relevant documents related to Algerian 
Government policies, international organizations working papers or reports, 
academic journals correlated to the present topic, will allow the development of 
analytical solution to my work.  
 
6. STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS  
 
This work is the occasion to deepen a little more the debate on the Algerian 
experience in the resolution of regional and international conflicts. I will try to 
analyze the active role of Algeria in the mediation for the resolution of the conflicts 
and the factors of success in its mediation. To achieve this I intend to divided into 
three chapters: The first chapter will deal with the active role and longue 
experience of Algerian diplomacy and the principles of Algerian foreign policy 
based on the pacific resolution of conflicts. It was an opportunity to recall some 
facts marking Algeria’s anti-colonial and post-colonial diplomatic action, a course 
which allowed, without exaggeration, a deep redefinition of the world balance. The 
second chapter will recall succinctly the historical background of Algerian 
mediation (1975-2015). We will focus particularly on the different conflicts 
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resolved via Algerian mediation from 1975 until the recent period. In the third 
chapter, finally, we analyze in detail the different success factors of Algerian 
mediation. As a conclusion, this thesis will bring together the main results we will 
















CHAPTER I: ALGERIAN DIPLOMACY AT THE SERVICE OF 
PEACE AND ITS ACTIVE ROLE (1962- CURRENT)  
 
Admitted to the UN in October 1962, Algeria pledged to work for peaceful 
cooperation among all countries on the basis of mutual respect among peoples. 
Thus, it has established diplomatic relations with almost all the countries of the 
world1. 
 
Participating in multiple international conferences, Algeria has, on several 
occasions, helped to solve complex situations. The dynamism it displays has 
allowed Algeria to clarify and strengthen its foreign policy since its accession to 
independence. This policy is determined by a set of factors that define the 
fundamental elements on which the choices of the country are articulated. 
 
In this chapter, I will explore in detail the historical evolution of Algerian foreign 
policy since 1962 until the current period. Furthermore, this chapter will examine 
                                                          




and highlight the importance of the mediation as a main component of Algerian 
foreign policy and the active role of diplomacy to succeed those mediations.  
 
1. A foreign policy based on ideological orientations: 1962-1965 
 
With the independence of Algeria in 1962, the political and ideological choices are 
determined. Four principles prevail: solidarity with the national liberation 
movements, anti-imperialism, strengthening of independence and national 
sovereignty, and finally, non-alignment (Mernache 2012, 1). 
 
The solidarity shown by newly independent Algeria with the national liberation 
movements is a logical consequence of its recent experience of colonization and 
war. The sympathy for these movements is natural, which is why Algeria has never 
hesitated to provide support, since 1962, to the most diverse movements in Africa 
(counting the African National Congress [ANC] in South Africa ), the Middle-East 




Anti-imperialism is also an essential orientation of Algerian diplomacy. In this 
context, a sign of sympathy manifests itself vis-à-vis the USSR, which diffuses at 
this time the idea that it would be the natural ally of the nationalist movements of 
the Third World. However, this orientation will not go too far: the memory of the 
prudence of the USSR during the Algerian war on the question of the official 
recognition of the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic (GPRA, 
founded in September 1958) acts for to limit this sympathy with Moscow. In 
addition, the desire of Algerian leaders to maintain their freedom of action 
intervenes to keep distances with the USSR. 
 
The strengthening of independence and national sovereignty is also a continuation 
of the period of war. Algerian leaders sought to recover the attributes of national 
sovereignty politically, economically and culturally:  
 
• Politically, by conducting an active foreign policy; 
• Economically, by the reappropriation of the Algerian economic potential; 
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• Culturally, by the restoration of Algerian national heritage, particularly in 
linguistic matters. Arabic, the national language, now occupies an important 
place and a process of Arabization is implemented. 
 
The active non-alignment is reflected in the Algerian desire to promote an effective 
and demanding third-world policy in order to promote the visions, interests and 
socio-political choices of developing countries. Algerian diplomacy is particularly 
active at the international level to make its voice heard. It presents itself as the 
spokesman of the Third World. The new Algerian leaders also proclaim the need to 
fight against the nuclear arms race and the development of the nuclear tests2. 
 
These options remain valid beyond the first years of Algerian independence. On 
the personal level, Ahmed Ben Bella, the first president of independent Algeria, is 
marked by the war, which he spent from 1956 to 1962 in French prisons, where he 
established a political cultural base Marxizing trend. His entourage and some of his 
                                                          
2 France conducted 17 nuclear tests between 1960 and 1966 in the Algerian desert (in the localities 




advisers are also quite marked by this ideological orientation. A. Ben Bella was 
excluded in 1965 from the Algerian political staff (Ait-Chaalal 2002, 63). 
 
2. A very active and influential diplomacy: 1965-1978 
 
Under the presidency of Houari Boumediène, the principles of national 
independence, anti-imperialism and non-alignment are reaffirmed. They form the 
pillar of Algerian foreign policy. 
 
National independence, international cooperation based on the respect of the 
sovereignty of the partners, rejection of the politics of the blocs (Western Bloc vs. 
Eastern Bloc)  and the military bases, refusal of the economic exploitation of the 
Third World by means of the foreign trade, the international capital or the sale of 
"technology", are the priorities that Algeria should defend and respect through its 
foreign policy, to contribute to the establishment of international relations that 
serve all peoples instead of enriching more richer countries and  impoverishing the 




In addition, foreign policy must reflect domestic politics. Algerian diplomacy, 
embodied by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, and his team, 
highlights some domestic actions for dissemination to the Third World, particularly 
in the field of recovery of hydrocarbon resources3.  
 
The year 1967 affirmed the strong presence of Algeria on the international scene 
through: support to the Arab countries during the June 1967 war, the subsequent 
rupture of diplomatic relations with the United States and the meeting in Algiers 
Group of 77 (developing countries). Algeria participates actively in diverse 
organizations such as the United Nations Organization (UNO), the Organization of 
African Unity (OAU), the Non-Aligned Movement, the United Nations Conference 
on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the Organization of the Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC). These events are combined with an internal 
dynamism with, in particular, the nationalization of hydrocarbons in February 1971 
(Belkaïd 2009, 339). 
 
                                                          




At the international level, the dynamism of Algerian foreign policy is reflected in 
the organization in Algiers of the summit of non-aligned countries in September 
1973; the Arab summit of November 1973 (following the Arab-Israeli war of 
October 1973); the convening of a UN Special General Assembly on Commodity 
and Development Issues in April 1974; the organization of an OPEC summit in 
March 1975; and Algeria's participation in the Conference on International 
Economic Cooperation (CIEC) from 1975 to 1977, a conference known as the 
"North / South Dialogue". 
 
3. Beyond its ideological orientations, a more pragmatic foreign policy:1979-
1992 
 
The foreign policy of Algeria under Chadli Bendjedid is marked by the loss of 
some important issues inherited from the previous period of their importance. Thus, 
the issue of North / South dialogue and that of non-alignment are no longer priority 
issues on the international scene. The failure of the conference on international 
economic cooperation, concluded in June 1977 on a finding of disagreement, 
marks the decline of this question. The last important event on this issue is the 
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Cancun (Mexico) summit4 in October 1981, which brought together the leaders of 
22 developed and developing states, in which the Algerian president is 
participating. The non-aligned movement is losing its coherence, and events like 
the Iran-Iraq war are weakening it even more (See Nicole GRIMAUD 1991). 
 
In the Middle East, the June 1982 is marked by the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. 
Algeria continues to signify its commitment to the Palestinian cause by hosting, in 
Algiers, numerous Palestinian National Councils (PNC), including the one of 
November 15, 1988, by which the independent State of Palestine is proclaimed. 
Algeria is, thus, the first country to recognize this State. 
 
In the first years of the arrival of President C. Bendjedid, the problem of Western 
Sahara is still important. However, interest in this issue is gradually declining to 
eventually move it to a secondary priority (Ait-Chaalat 2001, 483). The Maghreb 
integration is seen by the Algerian president as, on the one hand, a priority, and on 
the other hand, by synergy effect, likely to provide a solution to this question of 
Western Sahara. This view prevails with the restoration of diplomatic relations 
                                                          
4 The Cancun Summit brought together 22 heads of state. Algeria and Saudi Arabia were the only 
two Arab states. 
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between Algeria and Morocco, in May 1988, and the organization of the first 
Maghreb summit of Zéralda (Algeria), in June 1988. The Arab Maghreb Union 
(AMU) was created in February 1989 in Marrakech, bringing together Algeria, 
Libya, Morocco, Mauritania and Tunisia. 
 
This choice was that of the Algerian president, and not that of some important 
Algerian officials, especially at the level of Foreign Affairs. The diplomatic 
community considered that the settlement of the Saharawi question was the 
necessary precondition for the Maghreb integration process. 
 
The Algerian foreign policy of this period is often described as "rationalist" and 
more "pragmatic", much less ideological, despite the commitment to certain basic 
principles. 
 
The 1979-1991 period is marked by a certain "normalization" of Algeria's foreign 
policy. It appears that Algeria's internal developments are affecting its foreign 
policy. Thus, the serious economic and social problems it faces, accentuated in the 
mid-1980s by the fall in the price of hydrocarbons and the depreciation of the 
22 
 
dollar, have a negative impact on its foreign policy. In addition, the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs is losing some of its most experienced members during tragic 
events (Minister Benyahia's plane and his collaborators were shot down in the 
Middle East in 1982). The arrival of many people unfamiliar (members of the FLN 
party, the army and other state agencies) with the diplomatic function, especially as 
ambassadors, is losing a significant part of its cohesion and coherence to Algerian 
diplomacy5. In addition, budgetary restrictions, sometimes significant, are applied, 
which reduce the capacity of embassies (Ait-Chaalat 2001,) 
 
Several changes confirm the pragmatism displayed by Algeria in its foreign policy. 
For example, three events mark the relations between Algeria and the United States. 
 
In the early 1980s, Algeria played the role of mediator between the United States 
and Iran, which led to the release of American hostages in Tehran. In September 
1983, Vice President George Bush paid a visit to Algiers. This visit, although 
without immediate concrete results, allows rapprochement between the two 
                                                          
5 An attempt to professionalize Algerian diplomacy is implemented. New generations of diplomats 
appear from the National School of Administration (ENA). This trend grew and consolidated in the 




countries. Finally, in April 1985, the Algerian president paid an official visit to the 
United States, the first of an Algerian head of state. This visit is described as a 
success, and one of its first concrete results is the inclusion of Algeria on the list of 
countries likely to acquire US military equipment. Algiers has managed to 
diversify its suppliers in terms of defense equipment. Some American official 
circles now qualify Algeria as a "friend" when it is described as "radical" a decade 
ago. Some even speak of "complementarity" between the foreign policies of the 
two countries. 
 
With France, this period was marked by a relative improvement of the bilateral 
relations with the will to overcome the recurring problems. Indeed, a few months 
after his election, President François Mitterrand paid an official visit to Algiers in 
December 1981, followed by the official visit to Paris of C. Bendjedid in 
November 1983 - the first of an Algerian head of state in France. Until the 
beginning of 1992, which marks the resignation of President C. Bendjedid, the 
relations between the two countries continue at the rate of the fluctuations that 




In general, following the riots of October 1988, Algerian leaders, including the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, have as their main concern to ensure the stability of 
the State and the revival of a destabilized economy. The more classic foreign 
policy issues become secondary in such a context. The period of the crisis and the 
Gulf War (from August 1990 to February 1991), however, marks a relative return 
of Algerian diplomacy to the forefront, without resulting in durable effects. 
 
4. The foreign action of Algerian diplomacy handicapped by an unstable 
domestic context:1992-1999 
 
The 1990s are marked by events of great violence that affect the country. Algeria is 
facing armed groups. On the political side, Algeria saw the succession of, since 
Chadli Bendjedid's resignation in January 1992, four heads of state: Mohamed 
Boudiaf (from January to June 1992) 6 , Ali Kafi (from June 1992 to January 
1994). ), Lyamine Zeroual (from January 1994 to April 1999) and A. Bouteflika 
(since April 1999). 
 
                                                          
6 The head of state, Mohamed Boudiaf, was murdered in June 1992. 
25 
 
During this period of political instability, insecurity and violence, Algerian 
diplomacy has been disadvantaged to conduct an intense activity on the 
international scene. Indeed, the external management of its internal crisis 
monopolizes its external action to the detriment of other international issues. 
Algerian diplomacy then limited itself to preserving Algeria's relations with its 
foreign partners and avoids the isolation of the country (Belkaïd 2009, 342). 
 
From 1992 to 1994, there was a real expectation of the regime, its strength and its 
ability to cope with the situation; caution is required. From 1995 to 1997, there was 
a gradual change of attitude towards the Algerian government, with a more 
favorable inclination towards it, particularly from the election of L. Zeroual in 
November 1995. Since 1998, there has been a marked appreciation significantly 
more advantageous to the Algiers authorities and their ability to manage the 
situation. 
 
Unlike the previous two decades 1970s and 1980s, it is clear that the diplomacy of 





5. From 1999 to the present: A foreign policy based on dynamic diplomacy 
contributing to peace  
 
The election of A. Bouteflika, in April 1999, and his first acts on the international 
scene (Algiers OAU summit in mid-July, travel to the funeral of King Hassan II, 
end of July, participation in the UN General Assembly in September, presence in 
the international media), as well as the evolution of the internal political situation 
(approval by popular referendum of the law on civil concord7, September 16, 1999) 
contribute to reintegrate Algeria on the international scene. This reintegration is 
reflected, in particular, in the integration of Algeria into the Mediterranean 
Dialogue of the NATO in 2000, and in the signing of an Association Agreement 
with the European Union, in 2001. At the bilateral level, it is also reflected in 
                                                          
7 Law No. 99-08 of 13 July 1999 on civil concord is a law of amnesty proposed by Algerian 
President Abdelaziz Bouteflika. It aims to reintegrate into civilian life those who have shown their 
willingness to renounce armed violence and to amnesty those who have been involved in networks 
of support for terrorist groups during the dark decade. It provides for three separate regimes: 
 
• Exemption from criminal prosecution where the offense did not result in death or permanent 
disability, excluding rape and the use of explosives in public places (Articles 3 and 4). 
• Put on probation for a maximum of three to ten years, excluding those who have committed 
mass killings or used explosives in public places (Article 8). 




numerous official visits abroad, including a state visit to France in June 2000, and 
two meetings with President George W. Bush, in 2001, at the White House 
(Mernache 2012, 14) 
 
Currently, Algeria's foreign policy is focused on pursuing dynamic diplomacy, 
prioritizing the affirmation of the country's sovereignty, contributing to peace, 
defending just causes, promoting fraternity, and the development of cooperative 
relations. 
 
Algeria will remain committed to the construction of the Maghreb Union and 
support the question of Western Sahara for the self-determination of its people. It 
also supports the efforts of the UN Special Representative for Libya to restore the 
peace and security of that country. At the bilateral level, at the level of the Maghreb, 
Algeria will continue to build relations of dialogue, fraternity, solidarity, 





As far as the Arab world is concerned, Algeria remains committed to the 
strengthening of unity, and Arab common action, particularly within the Arab 
League. With regard to the Palestinian cause, Algeria will always stand in 
solidarity with the Palestinian people for the restoration of an independent and 
sovereign State with El Quds as capital. 
 
With regard to the Sahel region, Algeria reiterates its solidarity with the countries 
of the region in the fight against terrorism and transnational crime, and in the 
building of development. Algiers will continue to fully assume its obligations 
under the peace and reconciliation agreement in Mali. In Africa, Algeria will still 
be active in the African Union. In the context of mutual aid, African solidarity, and 
the political will to fully assume its commitment to the socioeconomic promotion 
of the continent, Algeria canceled the debt (1.5 billion US dollars) of 14 member 
countries8 of the African Union (AU). 
 
                                                          
8 These are the following countries: Benin, Burkina Faso, Congo, Ethiopia, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, 




In the Mediterranean area, Algeria will contribute for the promotion of peace, 
dialogue and cooperation. The country will continue to work with the European 
Union to achieve the partnership it has entered into with this economic entity (EU), 
and will participate in the political and strategic dialogue. Algiers will promote 
bilateral relations with EU member states in the framework of fair mutual interests. 
 
Algeria is also committed to being an active member of the Global 
Counterterrorism Forum [GCTF] (of which it is a member), and will also 
contribute to strengthening international cooperation in the fight against terrorism.  
Since the beginning of the 2000s, the fight against terrorism has produced 
diplomacy of advocacy, consisting of convincing the international community of 
the merits of Algerian counterterrorism policy. This diplomacy can be considered 
as having security legitimacy (Dris-Aït Hamadouche 2013, 3). 
 
At the bilateral level, Algeria will continue to maintain the traditional friendly 
relations, dynamic dialogue and cooperation it has established with its partners, on 
the European continent, in Asia and in the Americas9. 





It is true that Algerian diplomacy has succeeded in promoting and defending an 
exact image of Algeria, faced with any external attempt to distort it, in the media or 
in international forums. However, this intense international activity is sometimes 
criticized in Algeria, as being conducted at the expense of the priority issues of 
domestic politics. But in another side, the economic diplomacy remains a foreign 
concept to the actors of the foreign policy of Algeria, at a time when Algeria is 
facing serious economic difficulties.  
 
Conclusion of chapter I 
 
During the last fifty years, Algeria's foreign policy has been crowned by prominent 
achievements. It is dynamic and militant in its period from 1962 to 1978 (A. Ben 
Bella and H. Boumediène). The beginning of the next presidency (C. Bendjedid, 
1979-1992) benefits from the “passive resistance” of previous years. Thus, 
Algerian diplomacy, taking advantage of the experiences of the Boumediène period, 
plays a decisive role in several international mediation cases. But the internal 
transformations of Algeria and international developments combine to diminish its 
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external action. From 1985-1986, domestic and global economic constraints 
reinforce this trend. The phase following the riots of October 1988 reveals a 
gradual erasure of Algeria on the international scene, its political leaders focusing 
on the management of internal difficulties. From 1992, Algeria experienced a 
political, economic and social crisis of extreme gravity. Its international action is 
clearly affected. After a phase of absence, Algeria is gradually re-entering the 
international arena, starting in the mid-1990s. However, internally, it still faces 
major structural difficulties. From 1999 and in order to promote the place and the 
role of Algeria in the world, the foreign policy of Algeria is focused on pursuing a 
dynamic diplomacy under the leadership of President A. Bouteflika. Foreign policy 
now focuses on affirming the country's sovereignty, contributing to peace and 




CHAPTER II: AN OVERVIEW OF THE HISTORY OF 
ALGERIAN MEDIATION (1975-2015) 
 
With its continental credibility and large experience in mediation, Algerian 
diplomacy has been called upon several times to find peaceful solutions to disputes 
between countries or even to end armed conflicts between neighboring countries 
(border conflict) or other conflicts of a different nature (intrastate conflicts).  This 
has been the case, for example, in the case of US hostages held in Iran, the Iraq-
Iran, Ethiopia-Eritrea and Mali-armed group’s conflicts. Intuitively, it is strong of 
the aura of its Revolution (1945-1962), its credibility and the quality of the 
relations that it maintains with all the members of the international community, that 
Algeria managed to carry out negotiations. 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to focus on four empirical cases (conflicts that 
Algeria has been able to resolve), relying on the Algerian reference to clarify the 
main features of the international mediation of a state of middle power. Otherwise, 
it proposes an approach of historical analysis of the Algerian mediation since 1975 
until the recent period 2015.  
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1. The settlement of territorial disputes between Iran and Iraq on March 
1975 
 
International recognition was expressed following the Iraq-Iran agreement signed 
in Algiers in 1975 during the OPEC summit, after an effective and discreet 
mediation by President Houari Boumediene (Merrills 2012, 36). 
 
This conflict, at the origin of which is the question of sovereignty over the Chatt El 
Arab river, is a great source of tension in this region of the world and threatens, 
between 1969 and 1975, to end with the outbreak of a war between the two 
countries. This permanent tension is exacerbated by a clash over Kurds in northern 
Iraq, which accuses Iran of using the community as a means of pressure on Iraq 
and also, the rivalry for regional leadership (Michael and al. 2012, 137). 
 
The relations between Baghdad and Tehran are deteriorating continuously: 
dismissal of ambassadors, rupture of diplomatic relations, war situation in 
Kurdistan and border clashes. Turkey and Jordan are repeatedly trying to settle the 
dispute. Unsuccessfully. At the time of the 1st OPEC summit in Algiers, which will 
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devote the sovereignty of the oil producing countries to their natural resources, the 
Iran-Iraq relations are still execrable and have just been aggravated by a 
resumption of the war in Kurdistan and a massive influx of Kurdish refugees to 
Iran. 
 
It is in absolute discretion, that President Houari Boumediene initiates mediation 
between the Shah of Iran Mohamed Reza Pahlavi and Saddam Hussein, then Vice 
President of Iraq, present at the summit. President Boumediene announced at the 
closing session of the OPEC summit that an agreement, sponsored by Algeria, was 
concluded the day before between Baghdad and Tehran. The agreement, fruit of a 
negotiation, carefully conducted by President Boumediene and Abdelaziz 
Bouteflika, then Minister of Foreign Affairs, establishes a definitive demarcation of 
land and water borders between the two countries. 
 
Algeria's mediation thus ends an old conflict and will allow normalization of 
relations between the two countries until September 1980, when Iraq denounces the 




To put an end to the war, Algerian diplomacy is once again committed to resolving 
the conflict. This is one of his brilliant diplomats, Mohamed-Seddik Benyahia, who 
takes charge of the case. On May 3, 1982, at the entrance of the Iranian space, the 
plane - which transports the Algerian peace missionary and fifteen other passengers 
- is shot down (Michael and al. 2012, 138). 
 
2. The settlement of the Iran hostage crisis in 1981 
 
Among the negotiations that have been given to Algerian diplomats to take an 
active part, we quote the case of US hostages held for 444 days in Tehran and 
released after long and hard negotiations. 
 
The competence of the Algerian negotiators, their courage, their perseverance and 
their impartiality allowed a peaceful resolution of the conflict. It was not easy for 
those who have lived through this event to find a peaceful solution to this crisis. 
The positions were diametrically opposed and the situation made very complex by 
the great hostility in the relations between Tehran and Washington, especially that 
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the United States had, shortly before the entry into the contest of Algeria on April 
24, 1980, attempted intervention military to free its hostages. 
 
The intervention, based on an article of the United Nations Charter on Self-Defense, 
had been a complete failure and turned to disaster. Eight American soldiers had 
been killed. The break-up of diplomatic relations between the two countries in 
April 1980 was going to remove any option for direct negotiation and deadlock. 
 
To unblock this situation, Washington and Tehran had to turn to Algiers, which 
became for many countries a hub of international negotiation. 
 
Algeria had managed, indeed, a few years before, in 1975, to bring Iran and Iraq to 
put an end to a long border conflict thanks to the fruitful mediation of the H. 
Boumediene president. This role, Algeria would assume it all the time that lasted 
the negotiation. And here again, it admitted, according to many diplomats, great 
abilities to master the techniques of international negotiation. Already invested 
with the confidence of Iran which had chosen it to represent its interests in the 
United States, Algiers was naturally appointed by the United States to play this role 
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of mediator because having good relations with the one and the other and having 
observed strict neutrality in this conflict. 
 
It was, however, respect for its revolution, the aura of its leaders, and the talent of 
its diplomats that would determine this choice, noted political circles. Algiers 
became the trading headquarters between Tehran and Washington marked by an 
incessant diplomatic comings and goings between November 1980 and January 
1981. Warren Christopher then US Assistant Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs 
made several vists to Algiers to meet the late Mohammed Seddik Benyahia, at the 
time, in charge of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the same time as the efforts of 
the three Algerian negotiators, Abdelktim Ghraieb, ambassador in Tehran, Redha 
Malek, ambassador in Washington and Seghir Mostefai, governor of the Bank of 
Algeria10. 
 
The negotiation was very tight because of the demands made by the Iranian side. 
But the Algerian mediators managed to bend the positions to bring them back to 
the acceptable threshold. All this long and painstaking process would lead to the 
                                                          
10 Ministry for Foreign Affairs, la diplomatie algérienne au service de la paix, infernal document. 
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signing of two declarations on January 19, 1981. The dispute was to end with the 
United States’ commitment not to interfere in Iran's internal affairs, repatriation of 
frozen Iranian funds and cancellation of sanctions against Iran. 
 
Algeria had actively mediated and paved the way for a peaceful solution by 
minimizing divergences between the two protagonists. It was also the assurances 
given by Algiers on the terms of release, reception and protection of the hostages 
that had allowed the application of the terms of the agreement with the highlight of 
their release on January 21, 1981, transported by two aircrafts of the Algerian 
national carrier. 
 
The role of Algeria in 1981 in the crisis of American hostages held in Iran for more 
than a year; gave a memorable page in the history of the United States. It is worth 
mentioning that this crisis precipitated the fall of President Jimmy Carter The 





3. The conclusion of  peace treaty between Ethiopia and Eritrea in 2000 at 
Algiers 
 
In Africa, President Bouteflika has invested himself in the search for a solution to 
the border conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea, a conflict that has left tens of 
thousands dead and ruined the economy of both countries. 
 
In 1999, while holding the presidency of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), 
Algeria is mandated to find a pacific solution to the border dispute between 
Ethiopia and Eritrea, which has degenerated into armed conflict in May 1998. 
 
The occupation of the Badme region by Eritrean soldiers, then under Ethiopian 
occupation, exacerbates the conflict between the two countries, already at odds 
over the border areas. In order to prevent the situation from escalating, the OAU 
had to prepare a settlement plan in 1998 as well11. The United Nations was also 
called to the rescue, as was the US, which had developed a settlement plan, but 
without any convincing results. 





A framework agreement devised by different actors had come up against the 
intransigence of both parties, especially with regard to the origin of the conflict and 
the membership of the disputed regions. In July 1999, the OAU presidency moves 
to Algeria, which is mandated by Africa to continue efforts to reach a peaceful 
resolution of the conflict. On the basis of the framework agreement endorsed by the 
pan-African organization, Algeria has rushed to first obtain a cessation of 
hostilities before moving on to a compromise between the two parties to the 
conflict. 
 
Then followed a series of visits s of the President of the Republic, Abdelaziz 
Bouteflika himself in the Eritrean and Ethiopian capitals, A. Ouyahia, special 
envoy of President Bouteflika, A. Messahel, Minister Delegate for Maghreb and 
African affairs. Indirect talks are taking place in Algiers and technical meetings are 
being held in Washington. 
 
As early as July 1999, Algeria took the initiative of convening in Algiers a group of 
experts including Algeria, the OAU, the UN and the USA to discuss a 
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peacekeeping operation, the institution of a military coordination commission and 
the redeployment of troops to the previous positions. The negotiations are 
extremely difficult. They will last more than a year and a half. 
 
A peace agreement was lastly signed in Algiers on 12 December 2000 by the 
foreign ministers of both countries in the presence of President Bouteflika, US 
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, as well as representatives of the OAU and 
the UN. 
 
Algeria has conducted intense mediation between the two countries, with its 
American and European partners to bring the peace process to a successful 
conclusion in the Horn of Africa. This eight-page peace agreement provides, 
among other things: 
 
(i) The cessation of hostilities, where the antagonists shall abstain from any threat 
of use of force or, the use of force against the other party (Art. 1). (ii) The parties 
will proceed without delay to the liberation and repatriation or sending back to 
their previous place of residence, of all persons detained as a result of the armed 
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conflict. In addition, (iii) agree to establish a five-member neutral border 
commission with the mandate to demarcate and differentiate the colonial border on 
the basis of the colonial treaties (1900, 1902 and 1908) and international law 
applicable. Finally, (iv) the two countries may convert at any time to settle 
outstanding claims, individually or in categories, through direct negotiations or 
through recourse to another mutually agreed settlement mechanism12. 
 
4. The resolution of the Mali’s politico-military crisis  
 
Since January 17, 2012, an internal conflict has emerged between Tuareg 
movements (the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad: MNLA) and 
the government of Bamako. Several events are followed one another progressively 
to worsen the situation: the dismissal by a military coup of the Malian president, on 
March 23, 2012, the presence of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in 
Timbuktu, the proclamation on April 6 of a secular independent state in northern 
Mali by the MNLA, which has allied itself with the jihadist Ansar Eddine 
movement led by Iyad Ag hali, former leader of the Tuareg rebellion of 1991. 
                                                          





In terms of the typology of the actors involved in the Malian conflict, the most 
relevant are (Keita 2018, 26): 
 
• National actors: the parties (Government, as well as the Platform for self-
defense movements and, the CMA: Coordination of Azawad Movements). The 
CMA and the Platform are part of a collective but keep their capacity for action. 
They are all composed of several subgroups even more diversified; 
• The informal actors are those who felt at a particular time cramped in the peace 
process: they are sub-groups that were part of either the CMA or the Platform 
and have just regrouped in the Coordination of Movements of the Entente 
(CME); 
• Actors outside the peace process but who have a great capacity for harm and 
who did not participate in the Algiers process, from the moment they were not 
eligible (armed groups from the region resulting from the process of Algiers so-
called of the center namely: the "Islamists" of the Macina Liberation Front - 
FLM - and Nusrat al-Islam Wal-Muslimin - Support Group for Islam and 
Muslims - under the aegis of Iyad Ag Ghaly); 
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• Regional and international actors who participated in the negotiation process 
(Sahel groups); 
• The international community (UN, MISAHEL: Mission of the African Union 
for Mali and Sahel, EU, etc.); 
• Permanent members of the UN Security Council (France, United States, etc.). 
 
As for mediation, the government of Bamako and international experts (African 
and Western diplomats) are leaning for a panel of mediators involving Algeria, the 
African Union, ECOWAS and the UN. But after reading the armed groups' 
roadmap proposals, there is a significant divergence between the parties on the 
definition of mediator. For some, it is the role of Algeria that will have to be 
highlighted before starting negotiations. 
 
In the Malian conflict, this is the fourth time that Algeria has presented itself as a 
major mediator between the Malian government and the Tuareg separatist 
movements. The reintegration of Algeria in the Malian case has, therefore, relied 
on its long experience of mediating past crises, with the agreements of Tamanrasset 
(Algeria) in 1991, National Pact in 1992 and, Algiers Accord in 2006. However, 
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the Tamanrasset Agreement negotiated under the auspices of Algeria, signed on 
January 6, 1991, was never implemented because of the coup d'état of March 26, 
1991. The signing of the National Pact, April 11, 1992 in Bamako, negotiated 
under the auspices of Algeria and facilitation by strong personalities such as: Edgar 
Pisani and Baba Miske. While the signing of the Algiers Accord in 2006, supposed 
to make practical corrections, could not eradicate social divisions or tribal 
reconfigurations in Kidal. 
 
Through the existing literature, the causes of the failure of previous peace 
agreements are: the deficit in institutional governance characterized by the loss of 
state authority; widespread corruption and lack of transparency in the management 
of public funds; non-respect of the rule of law (injustice and impunity); failure in 
government communication. Other factors also explain this failure (Keita 2018, 
30): 
 
•the violation of the commitments, approved by the signatory parties, of the 
previous agreements for the settlement of the various crises and armed rebellions; 
•lack of monitoring and evaluation of previous agreements; 
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•non-involvement of civil society in the implementation and monitoring of the 
Agreements; 
•inadequate management of precedent crises; 
• Slowness in the political and institutional reforms resulting from the signature of 
the Agreements and their implementation. 
 
In April 2013, the United Nations Security Council has created a United Nations 
Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) with a 
total strength of about 15,000 peacekeepers13. 
 
Algeria as a mediator, favors decentralization over autonomy, the central 
government should detain more power. Algiers supports the idea of making the 
institutions of Bamako more inclusive and representative of the populations of the 
north, but rejects giving their local institutions greater autonomy. In addition, 
Algiers has, tirelessly, supported the territorial integrity of Mali. It strongly 
contested this idea of Tuareg separatism in Mali. 
                                                          






After nearly eight (8) months of negotiations, the Government of Mali signed 
between May and June 2015, the Agreement for peace and reconciliation in Mali 
with rebel armed movements. The Agreement contains a preamble, seven (7) Titles, 
68 Articles and four (4) Annexes referring to the themes of the negotiations 
conducted (Political and Institutional Reforms, Defense and Security, Development, 
Reconciliation and Transitional Justice).  
 
The analysis of this peace agreement concluded at the end of the process of 
mediation allow us to highlight certain pro-African originalities established by 
Algeria, such as the formulas of power sharing, transitional government, 
transitional justice, disarmament, reintegration of ex-combatants, and monitoring 
mechanisms (setting up monitoring committees for the implementation of the 
Peace Agreement). 
 
Finally, an African solution to African problems was successfully experienced in 





Conclusion chapter II 
 
It is recognized that Algeria has long been a crossroads of international negotiation. 
By their abilities, Algerian diplomats have, very often, unlocked complicated 
situations putting their talent at the service of peace in the world. Algeria has been 
particularly active in the field of mediation, whether it is taking the initiative, 
supporting ongoing mediation efforts, or exerting pressure to obtain results 
consistent with its vision. To summarize, Algeria has affirmed its effective role of 
international mediator (we can mention: the settlement of the crisis of the hostages 
of the American embassy in Tehran in 1981, the peace treaty between Ethiopia and 
Eritrea in 2000, the treaty on the settlement of territorial disputes between Iran and 
Iraq in 1975, the Peace and Reconciliation Accord on 2015 in Bamako). Algeria 




CHAPTER III: ANALYSIS OF THE SUCCESS FACTORS OF 
ALGERIAN MEDIATIONS 
 
For Algeria, mediation appears as a privileged method of pacific settlement of 
inter-state and intra-state conflicts. Mediation is a valuable tool for conflict 
prevention, management and resolution, an effective instrument of pacification for 
states marked by multiform conflicts and crises.  
 
In this chapter, careful consideration must be given to determine as far as possible 
an exhaustive list of all success factors of Algeria’s mediations. 
 
1- Success factors related to the context of the mediation process 
 
As mentioned before, it is clear that every mediation is unique and has its own 
peculiarities. In practice, the success of mediation most often depends, on: (a) the 
intrinsic qualities of the mediator, (b) the adherence of parties to the mediation 
process, (c) aspects regarding the conflict itself, and (d) features belonging to 




1-1. The case of  Iran and Iraq dispute 
 
Some events have made this mediation an uneasy task to undertake. Firstly, from 
April 1969 until March 1975, relations between the two countries Iran-Iraq were 
the worst. After the dismissal of the ambassadors in January 1970, Iraq completely 
broke off relations with Iran on November 30, 1971. Secondly, "The Cold War" 
between the two countries increased. On the psychological level, a vast campaign 
of propaganda was undertaken on both sides.  Thirdly, the armed forces were 
concentrated on the border areas and many clashes took place, sometimes causing 
the death of soldiers and even civilians. While Baghdad supported opponents of the 
Iranian regime and expelled Iranian residents, Tehran gave support to Kurds in 
rebellion (Djalili 1975, 282). 
 
However, because of its high-quality relations with the two protagonists to the 
resolved conflict, this factor seems to be the main element of success that could 




Indeed, after Algeria’s independence, political relations between the two countries 
have been of good quality. Indeed, Tehran was one of the first countries to 
recognize Algeria's independence from the French occupation in 1962. Iran opened 
an embassy in Algiers in 1963. Three years later, Algeria opened similarly its 
Embassy in Tehran in 1966. The Algerian mediation between Iraq and Iran was 
thus the first result of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two 
countries during the 1960s. 
 
On the Iraqi side, the country has played a role in supporting the Algerian 
resistance against French colonialism through military and financial aid during the 
period 1954-1961 or through the United Nations conferences and Summit of the 
Non-Aligned Movement. Iraq was the first country to recognize Algeria's 
independence in 1962. 
 
In another angle, Iraq exhausted its forces during the years 1972-1975, years of 
great importance in the Arab-Israeli conflict14, because the October war broke out 
                                                          
14  The conflict is the name given to the tense relations and military conflicts between the 
surrounding Arab states (Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, Lebanon, Syria and Palestine) and Israel, since the 
creation of Israel on May 14, 1948. It has had as its organ of seven armed conflicts: the 1948 war, 
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against Israel in 1973. Iraq believed that it should participate to this war. At that 
time, Iraqi forces were standing on the eastern front of the country in anticipation 
of an eventual Iranian aggression on Iraqi territory. For Iraq and in order to provide 
the necessary conditions for its participation in the October war, it declared itself 
ready to resolve its conflicts with Iran by pacific means. 
 
Moreover, while there are clear cultural differences between Persian-speaking Iran 
and Arabic-speaking Iraq, they share the fact that the majority of Muslims are 
Shiites.  Almost 90 % Iranian, and between 60 and 65 % of Iraqis are Shiites15.  
Algeria, Iraq and Iran are Muslim countries, allied by a membership to the Islamic 
religion. Under these conditions, a minimum of cooperation exists between the 
countries.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                 
the Suez war in 1956, the Six Day War in 1967, the war of attrition in 1967, the Yom Kippur war in 
1973, the first Lebanon war in 1982, and the second Lebanon war in 2006. 
 
15 International Crisis Group. Iran in Iraq: How much influence? Report No. 38 on the Middle East - 





Long discussions were held with the presence of Algerian President Houari 
Boumediene to achieve a durable and final solution to the problems that persist 
between the two countries. The recourse by the Algerian side to the principles of: 
good neighborliness, territorial integrity, the inviolability of international borders 
and non-interference in the internal affairs of the two countries, has most probably 
accelerated the rapprochement of the two protagonists. 
 
Led in absolute secrecy and discretion, the Algerian mediation was thus free from 
any influence on the part of the public opinion and the media who are kept out of 
the way during the negotiation process. Unexpected reactions (biased comments, 
subjective press coverage) are discarded, which is partly and probably responsible 
for this success. 
 
1-2. The case of American Embassy's hostage taking in Tehran  
 




• In September 1980, economic sanctions did not produce the desired effects; the 
US military intervention ended in a disastrous failure. 
 
• Official contacts are therefore a necessary, if not sufficient, condition for the 
realization of any agreement. However, the establishment of official contacts was 
hampered by the fact that diplomatic relations between the United States and the 
Islamic Republic of Iran had broken off in April 1980. 
 
Also to mediate in this context two constraints have emerged. The first constraint 
was of a legal nature: the third State had to maintain diplomatic relations with both 
the United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Iran. This legal constraint 
was easily surmountable. The second constraint was of a political nature: the third 
State had to show strict and constant neutrality in the conflict between the United 





We may wonder why Algiers agreed to provide this effort, especially since the 
conflict did not involve any direct and immediate interest of the Algerian state, and 
that a possible failure would have been a negative effect to its international prestige.  
 
The choice of Algeria as a mediator was essential both on the American side and 
on the Iranian side. On the side of the United States, first, for reasons of pure 
efficiency, preferred direct contacts. But this possibility was excluded. The only 
possibility was the use of the services of a third State. The United States made it 
clear that Algeria represented the best choice for them. There are, at least, three 
reasons for this (Juillard 1981, 27): 
 
First reason: the political relations between the two governments, despite many 
divergences in their respective views, remain however in a satisfactory state. 
Algeria, which after the rupture of the diplomatic relations between Washington 
and Tehran, had been charged to represent the Iranian interests in the United States. 
 
Second reason: Algeria had observed an attitude of strict neutrality in the conflict 
between the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran. But it was known that 
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if it had not made any formal condemnation of the actions of the Iranian students, it 
did not hesitate to denounce it in these unofficial conversations. It was clear, 
therefore, that it would do what was necessary to try to resolve an embarrassing 
situation for the Arab world, on which it made an unfavorable judgment. 
 
Third reason: the attitude of the Algerian government, throughout the crisis, had 
earned him the sincere recognition of the US government. Algeria had indeed been 
associated with both the humanitarian missions and diplomatic attempts that 
marked the year 1979 and the year 1980. It had thus demonstrated its deep concern 
to avoid any irreparable action and its constant desire to promote a pacific 
settlement. 
 
On the side of the Islamic Republic of Iran, secondly, for reasons of domestic 
policy, did not want the resumption of direct contacts with the United States. But it 
nevertheless came to the definite conclusion that a quick solution would best serve 
the national interest. Recourse to the services of a third State was therefore the only 
possibility. And the choice of Algeria was necessary, for reasons of objective order 
as for reasons of subjective order. For objective reasons, on the one hand, both 
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Algeria and Iran are Third World countries, and this common membership helps to 
create a certain identity of international sensibilities. Both Algeria and Iran are 
Arab countries, that is to say, both are part of a whole that seeks its political unity 
both internally and externally. 
 
Algeria and Iran are Muslim countries, bound by a strict obedience to the Islamic 
religion. For subjective reasons, on the other hand, the revolutionary similarities, as 
a common denominator, will certainly have contributed to the establishment of 
privileged relations between Algeria and Iran. For although it is obvious that the 
source of inspiration for the Algerian Revolution (1954_1962) and the Iranian 
Revolution is not the same, the fact remains that any revolutionary experience is 
expressed first of all by the rejection of previous system that is to say the Western 
model, also abhorred by Algeria and Iran. Above all, Algeria has been able to 
observe an attitude of strict neutrality in the conflict between Iraq and Iran: and it is 
perhaps above all this attitude that made it fit to play the mediator between the 




Finally, Algeria's role has not been that of a passive mediator, but that of an active 
mediator. Algiers knew how, when the time came (well-timed intervention), to 
modify the course of the event by using the influence which it was worth its 
privileged position to bring, in turn, each of the two parties to modify its positions. 
The action of Algerian diplomacy constitutes effective techniques of international 
negotiation. It has been perceptible in four forms (www.crisisgroup.org): 
 
i. Algeria has attempted to make an inventory of points of agreement and points 
of disagreement, so as to delimit the scope of negotiation in a strict manner. 
ii. Algeria has been keen to ensure that each party formulates its proposals so as 
to eliminate elements that would not be acceptable to the other party. 
iii. Algeria focused on finding the means for resumption when the negotiation 
faced seemingly insurmountable obstacles. 
iv. Algeria sought to sort out the various options submitted to it by each party so 
as to submit to the other party the option that it could accept. 
 




Algeria has encountered several political and technical constraints to mediation, 
which has made its task difficult. The first constraint was that the Eritrean 
government alleged the OAU's partiality, given the presence of its headquarters in 
Addis Ababa. Neutrality conditions the acceptability of the intermediary by all 
parties. As a second constraint, the problem of confidentiality arose in that the 
OAU host country potentially had greater access to information; any information 
given to an international organization generally entered the public domain. The 
third constraint was that Algeria was hardly confronted with inter-state conflict in 
the strict sense of the word, but in fact faced with a conflict of personalities 
between the two leaders - Zenawi and Issayas Afeworki - which limited its ability 
to intervene. The fourth constraint is the fact that Algeria was facing the Ethiopian 
and Eritrean parties, who obviously developed strategies to try to maximize their 
diplomatic gains in the context of mediation: Ethiopia has constantly readjusted its 
objectives and its diplomatic strategy to demand "ever more" concessions from its 
Eritrean enemy while the Eritrean strategy was difficult to understand (Lecoutre 
2005, 42). 
The process of Algerian mediation has been reinforced by the credibility of the 
Algerian presidency. Algeria inherited the annual presidency of the OAU at the 
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35th ordinary session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government held in 
Algiers from 10 to 12 July 1999. Algerian President Bouteflika had essential 
qualities to the success of its mediation by the OAU16. 
 
First, his charisma as a head of state involved in a high level of responsibility in the 
affairs of the African continent since the early 1960s, earned him a continental and 
international credibility. In fact, A. Bouteflika was the youngest African Minister 
for Foreign Affairs, serving from 1963 to 1978. He presided over the Twenty-ninth 
General Assembly of the United Nations in 1974, the most glorious time of the 
third world, and the world has retained the image of a militant, among others, 
particularly committed to apartheid, non-aligned countries and G77 developing 
countries17. 
 
                                                          
16 Currently President Bouteflika has always been the master of the external affairs. The Algerian 
diplomatic effort throughout his reign was a personal effort both in drafting and implementation, in 
the nature of the means used and the tools through which to carry out foreign policy. The President 
of the Republic is always present in person in international seminars, meetings, summits and 
permanent visits to countries. This process has always been particularly prominent during his first 
term (1999-2004), where it found that he made 32 official visits within two years. 
 
17   See «General Assembly of the UN - President of the 68th Session - Abdelaziz Bouteflika 




Second, Algeria, unlike many African countries, had a genuine diplomatic tradition 
and institutions that functioned effectively. As one of the first contributors and 
leaders of the OAU (and the AU afterwards), Algeria has borne the financial and 
logistical cost of this mediation. Algiers has, permanently, put at the disposal of the 
personal representative of the Algerian president a plane to make his numerous and 
tireless trips back and forth between Algiers, Addis Ababa and Asmara. 
 
Third, this mediation was perhaps an opportunity for Algeria to recognize 
Ethiopia’s mediation, in so far as Emperor Haile-Selassie had obtained the signing 
of a cease-fire between Algeria and Morocco in 1963 and then proposed to lead a 
meeting between President Ben Bella and King Hassan II on neutral ground, 
Bamako (Mali) as part of the mediation of the OAU at the time (Lecoutre 2005, 40). 
 
Furthermore, these two presidencies used a different way of operating (Burkina 
Faso chaired an ad hoc committee while Algeria acted solo) and benefited from 
dissimilar circumstances (ignorance of the precise power relationships during the 
Burkinabe presidency gave way to their clarification during the Algerian 
presidency due to developments on the ground). These two elements certainly 
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contributed to increasing the credibility of the Algerian presidency in its 
management of the dispute. It is also legitimate to specify that Algeria retained the 
monitoring of the conflict until the signing of the Algiers Accords in December 12, 
2000. The credibility of Algeria and its president had the faculty to reassure the 
protagonists. 
 
Despite persistent tensions between the two countries, the war has not resumed. On 
July 9, 2018, Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki and Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy 
Ahmed signed a peace treaty between the two countries in Asmara (after about 18 
years of the signing of the Algiers Agreement). 
 
1-4. The case of the politico-military crisis  in Mali  
1-4.1. Algeria, leader of the region and the need to maintain its leadership 
 
The exercise of mediation, in the broad sense, is a demanding task. Algeria has 
encountered during its mediation several complicating factors and many difficulties 
that combine. Thus, on the one hand, there is, between the parties themselves: 
• Breakdown of dialogue and communication; 
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• Breach of trust; 
• Increased misunderstanding and suspicion; 
• Demonization of the intentions of the other; 
• Exaggeration of the magnitude and scope of the differences; 
• Overheating of the psychological climate with the prevalence of the 
confrontational spirit; and 
• Tendency to refuse compromise. 
In parallel, Algeria is found, often in a narrow scope of evolution whose constraints 
are due to the: 
• Multiplication of actors involved in the conflict; 
• Confusion and overlapping approaches; 
• Duplication of efforts; 
• Tendency to manipulate stakeholders by the parties; 
• Rigidity of conventional procedures; and 





Also, in Mali's situation, terrorism and cross-border crime are active enemies of 
Algerian mediation. The popular uprisings that gave rise to foreign military 
interventions have been accompanied by the proliferation of terrorist groups. This 
has accentuated the difficulties and complexities of this case. 
 
Faced with such complicated situation, Algeria has always displayed commitment, 
discretion, know-how and perseverance because they are particularly suited to the 
design and conduct of works of peace that embrace complexity and sensitivity 
problems posed.  
 
The diplomatic choice of Algiers is made since Algeria was a mediator during 
many conflicts in the Sahel. It was during two Tuareg revolts in Mali between 1991 
and 1995 as well as in 2006 until 2009 that Algeria helped to establish a peace 




At the turn of the 2000s, at the end of the black decade in Algeria, the country 
wished to play the role of leader of the fight against terrorism in the region18. 
Algiers then signed in 2010 the Tamanrasset plan with Niger, Mali and Mauritania. 
This was the beginning of a joint military cooperation. At the same time, Algeria 
has granted development aid of around 10 million euros to Bamako19. 
 
Despite this desire for rapprochement, relations between the two countries remain 
tense. According to Algiers, Bamako was lax with AQIM (Al-Qaeda in the Islamic 
Maghreb), especially during the presidency A. T. Touré (2002 -2012). In addition, 
Mali is deemed unable to protect the confidential information that the two countries 
share. On the Malian side, some soldiers strongly criticized Algeria's refusal to 
deploy its army. Beyond the reproaches, the Tamanrasset plan did not give 
concrete and effective actions. Algeria especially wanted the agreement in order to 
prevent a Western presence. But other countries in the Sahel want western help. 
Moreover, a military mission was sent by the UN, the AU and the ECOWAS 
                                                          
18 This mediation was perhaps an opportunity for Algiers to recognize Mali warring assistance to 




(Economic Community of West African States) to make an assessment for an 
intervention of the neighboring African military forces. 
 
While northern Mali is becoming a stronghold of terrorists and its political 
situation is worsening, Algeria's diplomatic strategy is not changing. It finally 
maintains its position not to deploy its armed forces while wanting to maintain its 
leadership position in the region (an area that Algeria considers to be within its 
sphere of influence). 
 
1-4.2. Algeria's proactive foreign policy on the Mali conflict  
 
Algeria has adopted a very active foreign policy in the case of the Malian conflict, 
in particular by the multiplication of initiatives and a constant commitment. 
Moreover, the conflict was perceived by Algiers in a global and multidimensional 
point of view: socio-economic, political and security. In addition, Algiers has 
always advocated and supported a political solution for the settlement of the 




Finally, this ambition to remain a military force in the region led it to play an 
important role during Operation Serval 20  in Mali. Algeria first strengthened 
security at its borders with Mali in order to prevent any withdrawal of jihadists 
during the operation and then ensured that the supply of fuel to the groups in Mali 
was cut by reducing smuggling channels. However, the strongest gesture was the 
authorization given to french fighter aircrafts to fly over Algerian territory, 
something that had never been done since the end of French military bases in 
Algeria21 shortly after independence, but without involving its troops on the Malian 
soil. However, the fact that Ansar Dine left suddenly the negotiating table in 
January 2013 to embark on the offensive to the south a few days later, compels 
Algeria to support French intervention. In addition, the taking of hostages at the In 
Amenas gas site (Illizi province, Algeria), on January 16, 2013, by Belmokhtar’s 
islamist armed group, is creating an unexpected rapprochement with France 
(d’Evry 2015, 19).  
 
                                                          
20 Military action conducted in Mali by French troops. This intervention launched, in January 2013 
and completed in July 2014, to support the national army of Mali to repel armed Islamist groups that 
have taken control of Azawad in northern Mali. The goals of this intervention are to stop the 
advance towards Bamako of jihadist forces, secure the capital of Mali and recover the territorial 





On the other side of its mediation, Algeria has granted several grants and loans to 
Mali. It also proposes major investments in infrastructure (gas pipeline, trans-
Saharan road, etc.) for the development of the Sahel, in order to reduce crime and 
instability in the region. Algeria thus puts at the service of its foreign policy and its 
diplomacy the gas wealth which allows it to carry out a policy of mediation. Thus, 
Mali receives financial aid from Algeria. 
 
In its domestic policy, Algeria has also adopted a pragmatic position by taking into 
account vulnerabilities located in southern Algeria, particularly to strengthen the 
security of its borders with Mali. 
 
Significantly, Algeria emphasized the inclusiveness and collegiality of mediation 
as distinctive features of this collective effort which brought, for nearly a year, 
Mali's neighboring countries together with the Universal organizations 
(UN/MINUSMA), regional organizations (AU, EU, OIC) and sub-regional 
organizations (ECOWAS). France and the United States have also contributed to 
this effort within the framework of a so-called enlarged mediation team and 
through their respective interactions with the Malian parties. The latter, as well as 
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representatives of civil society, have been constantly available in Algiers, staying 
in the same places (Hotel El Aurassi in Algiers) for, important for mediation, 
facilitating human and social exchanges and building trust. 
 
2- Other factors of success 
 
This section will limit analysis on others factors that determine the success of 
Algerian mediation.  I will look for geopolitical, economic and cultural/religious 
features.  
2−1. The objective attributes of power in Algeria: material conditions 
of influence in its international role 
 
Algerian foreign policy also owes its political identity to objective attributes of 
power, which constitute the material conditions of influence (Dris-Aït Hamadouche 
2013, 2). By material conditions of influence, we mean the geopolitical situation, 
the economic and financial assets, military forces, and its active multilateralism. 




2−1.1. The geopolitical situation 
 
The geopolitical position represents a considerable asset insofar as it makes Algeria 
the gateway to Africa and the Arab world and a crossroads between three 
geopolitical eras (Africa, Arab World and Mediterranean). Its many and 
penetrating borders, of 6,343 km shared with 7 bordering countries, make it 
possesses a strategic depth which raise up its interest for the regional events (Table 
1). 
 
The Algerian territory covers 2,381,741 km² (four times the size of France or 60 
times Switzerland). It outperforms all European countries (except Russia). It is the 
first vast African, Arab, Muslim state and the Mediterranean basin. On the contrary, 
it is more or less far behind the largest states of Asia (Russia, China, and India), 
America (United States, Canada, Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina) and by Australia. 
Algeria is simply the 10th big country in the world. Its geography combines many 
assets including a coastline of more than 1,600 km and a huge Sahara of more than 




TABLE 1 : ALGERIA : GEOGRAPHICAL DATA 
Area 2,381, 741 km2 
Coastline 1,622 km 
Length of land borders 6,343 km 
List of land borders o 1,559 km with Morocco 
o 1,376 km with Mali 
o 982 km with Libya 
o 965 km with Tunisia 
o 956 km with Niger 
o 463 km with Mauritania 
• 42 km with Western Sahara 
Source : CIA World Factbook 
 
The Algerian population reached, in 2017, a little more than 41. 3 million 
inhabitants. It is very little for such a large country: 18 inhabitants per square 
kilometer on average. 
In fact, the resemblance of natural and human data justifies the comparison of 
Algeria with the Maghreb countries. The Algerian population is approximately 
equivalent to that of Morocco (35.7 million). It represents three times that of 
Tunisia (11.5 million) and six times that of Libya (6.3 million)22. So Algeria is also 
a demographic power of North Africa with a very young population since the under 
30 years represent 70% of the population. The regional power of the Maghreb also 
                                                          




benefits from hydrocarbon revenues and the prestige that its rich history brings to it. 
Algeria is thus one of the largest Maghreb states. 
 
2-1.2. Economic and financial assets  
 
Algeria is fairly well endowed with natural resources, energy and minerals, thanks 
to the riches of its Saharan territory. Algeria has Africa's first gold and currency 
reserves. Official foreign exchange reserves (excluding gold) rose from $ 6. 14 
billion in 1999 to $ 114.14 billion in 2016. It is the fourth largest economy in terms 
of GDP in Africa (after Nigeria, South Africa and Egypt), the third in the MENA 
region and the first in the Maghreb.  
 
According to the Bank of Algeria, the GDP is estimated at 148. 8 billion US$; in 
terms of volume, GDP grew by 3.3%, slightly down on 2015 (3.7%). Growth is 
steady - of the order an average of 3% a year for a decade - and Algeria has one of 
the largest economies in the Arab world.  It is the third largest oil exporter in 




TABLE 2: ALGERIA: MAIN SOCIOECONOMIC INDICATORS 
Indicators figures 
Population  (ONS, 2017) 41.3 million 
Population growth 2.17% 
density 18 hab. / km² 
Official languages Arabic and Tamazight (Berber)  





⚫ Upper house : Council of the Nation 
⚫ Lower house: People's National Assembly 
GDP, PPP (constant 2011 international 
$) 
565,28 billion US$ 
 
Composition of GDP by sector (%) 
⚫ Agriculture : 13.32% 
⚫ Industry : 37.78% 
⚫ Services : 48.9 
Economic growth (2016) 3.3% 
GDP per capita(constant 2011) in 2016 14,000 US$ 
Exports (2017, 10 first months)  28.7 billion US$ 
Imports (2017, 10 first months) 38.1 billion US$ 
Foreign exchange reserves 114.14 billion US$ 
Inflation rate (2016) 5,8% 
External debt  3.85 billion US$ (2% GDP) 
FDI, net inflows (% of GDP) 1.03% 
Urban population (% of total) 70% 
Unemployment  (2017) 10.1% 
Life expectancy (2016) ⚫ Male : 75 yeas 
⚫ Female: 77 years 
Access to electricity (% of population 
in 2016) 
99.44% 
Net ODA received in 2016 (% of GNI) 0.1% 
HDI (83th out of 191, PNUD 2015) 0,745 (High) 
Literacy rate  86% 





Algeria has also long been a mono-exporter of hydrocarbons (over 98% of total 
exports) to the European Union, the Maghreb and the USA, which purchase a 
significant fraction of its LNG (Liquefied Natural Gas). Even though Algeria is a 
mediocre producer in comparison with the Middle East region states, its oil, and 
particularly its gas, play a significant role in the Mediterranean geopolitical and 
economic relations, especially since the 1990s. The substance of Algerian 
hydrocarbons is due to a number of reasons:  
• The oil is of very high-quality.  
• Algeria has large reserves of natural gas, a source of energy that is less 
polluting than oil or coal, and Algeria's traditional relations with the countries 
of the northern Mediterranean, whose gas consumption is rising increasingly 
(Algeria is the 3rd gas supplier of the EU)23  make Algiers has partners of 
choice to sell its hydrocarbons (importers must be able to rely on reliable 
sources supply, which is the case of Algeria). The hydrocarbon reserves are 
spread over a little over 200 oil and gas deposits, located in the basins of Oued 
                                                          




Mya and Hassi Messaoud (67%), Illizi (14%) - where is the complex gas of In 
Amenas - Rhourde Nouss (9%) and Ahnet Timimoun (4%).24  
• Algeria could count on shale gas reserves that would represent nearly 17,000 
billion cubic meters, that is to say four times the current conventional reserves 
of the country. This would make it the world's 3rd largest reserve. But Algeria 
is expected to produce half as much conventional gas in twenty years, because 
of declining reserves, while its domestic consumption increases by 15% per 
year on average. Unconventional hydrocarbons could therefore represent an 
opportunity in a country where oil and gas account for 98% of exports and 
17.4 % of GDP in 2016 (www.bank-of-algeria.dz). To continue to insure its 
local needs and maintain its ability to export, the country wants to turn to the 
exploitation of shale gas. 
 
In terms of development, the country has achieved tangible results in many sectors 
(infrastructure, universities, transport networks...) and Algeria, can display 
encouraging statistics. Since 2001, there has been a gradual reduction in 
                                                          





unemployment as a result of government measures to create jobs - especially for 
young people - financed in part by the rise in oil prices (between 1998 and 2014 the 
prices have risen from $ 13 per barrel to over $ 140). In terms of employment, the 
unemployment rate is estimated at 10.1% of the active population (1.27 million 
people in 2017) against 27.3% in 2001. The youth unemployment rate (16-24 
years) remains 26.7% (40% in 2009), although down 3.2 percentage points from 
2015. As a result, government revenues have risen sharply and foreign exchange 
reserves have reached record levels (See Table 2). According to the World Bank, 
Algeria has also attained 20% poverty decrease in the precedent twenty years.  
 
With its small level of indebtedness, Algeria was ranked in 2017 by the IMF the 
least indebted country of the 20 countries of the MENA region with an external 
debt of 2% of the GDP and a public debt of 20% of GDP (Bank of Algeria). As 
regards the external debt, after the substantial repayment by anticipation in 2006, 
the total external debt of Algeria, which recorded in 2015 its lowest level ($ 3.02 





Despite the decline in total goods imports, the trade deficit widened by $ 2.04 
billion from $ 18.08 billion in 2015 to $ 20.13 billion in 2016. This is the second 
deficit after more than eighteen (18) years of consecutive surpluses. 
 
After two consecutive years of strong disinflation (2013 and 2014), the average 
annual rate of inflation accelerated in 2015. In 2016, it continued and reached 5.8% 
for the national Consumer Price Index. 
 
In addition, literacy is up (more than 96% in elementary school) while the 
connection to the electricity network is more 99% and we attended the launch of 
4G in October 2016.  
 
The country has made these last years massive investments in the country's 
infrastructure (roads, airports, universities, etc.) - which have also largely benefited 
foreign companies, especially Chinese - while the modernization of means of 
transport materializes: opening of the metro of Algiers, trams in major cities or 
renewal of the air fleet of Air Algeria national company. The gigantism of large 
public works does not seem to stop any more since Algiers is about to inaugurate 
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the largest seawater desalination plant in the world near Oran province with a 
capacity of 500,000 m3 of water per day thus gradually putting an end to the crises 
of drinking water supply in the big cities of the country. 
 
2-1.3. Military forces 
 
According to the World Bank25, Algeria ranks 5th in 2017 in terms of the ratio of 
military spending to 5.7% of GDP (in comparison, Morocco is in 16th  position 
with 3.2% of GDP) in the world. On the material side, Algeria is among the best-
endowed countries with some 985 battle tanks, 1,085 armored infantry fighting 
vehicles and 36 modern combat aircraft (and 71 older ones). Algeria is investing in 
the development of independent intelligence. The AlSat-2A satellite, whose optics 
allow imaging with a medium resolution (compared to US satellites) of 10 meters, 
was launched in July 2010. AlSat-2B was launched also on September 26, 2016. 
 
A voluntary defense policy and massive purchases of armaments, as well as 
modernization of the army, make Algeria the largest regional military power today. 
                                                          




With a defense budget estimated at $ 10.07 billion in 2017 ($ 3.9 billion in 2007), 
the eighth largest arms importer in the world ($ 905 million in 2017) has acquired 
modern means, including air. As a traditional customer of Russia, Algeria has 
however diversified its suppliers (United States, South Africa, France, Germany) 
over the past few years while gradually acquiring a military industry (Algiers has 
already built for example, armored infantry vehicles). Algeria also wants to 
increase its maritime military capabilities - it already manufactures corvettes - 
which shows that the country is aware of security challenges in the Mediterranean. 
 
In 2018, Algeria is ranked second among African states by military power index 
after Egypt, and ahead of South Africa, Angola and Ethiopia. By total military 
force (active forces, reserve forces, paramilitary forces) the most important in 
Africa, Algeria still occupies the second place with 467,200 soldiers, after Egypt 
(1,314,500 soldiers) and, in front of Morocco (395,800 soldiers). It is ranked 22nd 
in the world in the same year (Table 3). 
 
Indeed, Algeria's international role began as early as 1954, before independence, 
before it fully enjoyed its territory, its population and its resources. Diplomatic and 
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military action is not a consequence of the existence of the Algerian state: on the 
contrary it is the diplomacy of the FLN and the fight of the ALN that provoked the 
independence of Algeria. From 1954 to the present day, Algeria has based its 
international action on its membership of several blocks, in relation to which it is 
defined: the Maghreb, the Arab world, the Muslim world, Africa, the Third World, 
Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and the Mediterranean. 
 
Table 3 : ranking of top 5 African states by total military force in 2017 
Rank State active reserve paramilitary Total 
1 Egypt 438,500 479,000 397,000 1,314,500 
2 Algeria 130,000 150,000 187,200 467,200 
3 Morocco  195,800 150,000 50,000 395,800 
4 Sudan 244,300 85,000 20,000 349,300 
5 Eritrea 201,750 120,000 0 321,750 
Source: The military Balance 2017, International Institute for strategic Studies, 
Routeldge, London, 8February 2017, 504p. In Global Fire Power 
 
The magnitude of this great ambition inevitably comes up against the modest 
means of the country, which imposes on Algeria a double dependence:  strategic 
dependence on Russia and, economic and technological dependence on OECD 
countries, major customers of Algerian gas and oil and minerals, and major 




The example of Algeria invites us to distinguish between the potential power (the 
potential) of the effective power. Algeria has shown that it has an effective power 
far above its own potential. Conversely, many developed countries, allied with the 
United States, do not have an international political action commensurate with their 
potential or their economic power (the case of Italy, Germany and Japan). 
 
As a middle power country, Algeria is a great Maghreb power, since it has held the 
leadership since 1975 by declassifying Morocco in the Western Sahara war (1975− 
1991)26, without it daring to fight back on the Algerian territory, and can to be an 
African power. 
 
The distinction between the great powers and the middle powers among the 
developed states seems to Algeria less important. Between the developing States, 
Algeria does not want to make distinction of power: it presents itself as the 
representative of the small countries against the big countries. 
                                                          
26 The conflict of Western Sahara pits this former Spanish colony in Morocco since the Polisario 
Front declared it independent in 1976 under the name Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR). 
The war with the Polisario Front ends in 1991. Morocco controls about 80% of the territory, while 






2-1.4. A strong diplomatic presence in regional and international 
organizations 
 
Just after independence, international organizations are perceived by Algiers as the 
expression of international solidarity and a mean to facilitate technical and 
economic cooperation. More recently, international organizations have become a 
privileged place for the Algeria’s diplomatic action, which takes advantage of these 
forums not only to protect its interests, but also to try to make prevail its 
conception of international life, to formulate messages, to elaborate global and 
regional strategies or tactics. 
 
In order to have a rapid and suggestive image of the main international 
organizations (The list is not complete) to which Algeria has acceded, reference 
should be made to the table N 4 below, which distinguishes according to the nature 
(political, economic or technical) and the universal or regional character of the 
organization with which it is affiliated with an indication of the year of ratification 




Currently, Algerian multilateral diplomacy is active in making its voice heard in 
international forums, particularly on Arab, African and international issues 
(Organization of the Islamic Cooperation reform, NEPAD, Conference on 
Disarmament, climate change, fight against terrorism, nuclear energy, immigration, 
etc.). Algeria retains a central role in the African Union (AU) and reflects the 
Organization's thinking on the establishment of an African capacity for immediate 
crisis response (CARIC)27. The question of Maghreb (Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, 
Morocco and Tunisia) construction is still pending blocked by the thorny Western 
Sahara issue and subject to the evolution of the Algerian-Moroccan relationship.  
 
Member, since the year 2000 of the Mediterranean Dialogue, Algeria participates 
in several joint exercises28. 
 
                                                          
27 An initiative announced on 27 May 2013 on the occasion of the 15th anniversary of the African 
Union in Addis Ababa, CARIC (African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises) is launched in 
November 2013 to make the African Union a capable actor to respond effectively and credibly to 
crises and conflicts on the African continent. Of the 54 African countries only 12 countries have 
actually joined the project (South Africa, Algeria, Angola, Burkina Faso, Egypt, Niger, Uganda, 
Rwanda, Senegal, Sudan, Tanzania and Chad). 
 




Algeria is also engaged in dialogue in the Western Mediterranean (“5 + 5” 
initiative): Algiers chaired the work of the “5 + 5 defense” in 2016 and holds the 
presidency of the initiative for the southern Mediterranean countries for the 2016-
2018 bienniums. France and Algeria co-chair the 5 + 5 Foreign Affairs Dialogue 
until the end of 2017 and, through its involvement in the WTO accession process 
(Chikhaoui, 236). 
 
Founding member of the Global Counter Terrorism Forum launched in September 
2011 in New York. In 2013, it hosted an international meeting aimed at defining 
specific strategies and programs to combat the expansion of Al Qaeda and 
affiliated organizations, particularly in the Maghreb and the Sahel29. 
 
Furthermore, Algiers has always invested in the cooperation, security and stability 
of its neighbors and the African continent. Algeria has an advantageous position in 
the institutions and financing of the African Union. It is still part of one of the 
major political and diplomatic powers of the continent. 
                                                          
29 Algeria, for example, does not negotiate with terrorists and, calls for universalization of the ban 




Table 4  : Algeria and International Organizations 















































• ILO  
• FAO  
• ICAO  
• WHO  
• IMO 























• OIC…………… 1964 
 
 
Specialized institutions of the 
Arab League (they are 
progressively created) 
Source: collected from different sources based mainly on the website of the 
organizations. 
 
In spite of the difficulty of the task, Algeria is endeavoring to ensure a combination 
of these different strategic options (geopolitical, economic and financial, military 
and diplomatic) available to it, to guide its foreign policy with some autonomy vis-





2-2. Mediation: a tradition and an ancient practice very present in Algerian 
society 
 
In Algeria, the judicial mediation was introduced recently as an alternative method 
of dispute settlement at the time of implementing the new Code of Civil and 
Administrative Procedure. Mediation in its modern conception appeared in Algeria 
(law of 25 February 2008 entered into application in 2009). Book V of the Algerian 
Code of Civil and Administrative Procedure, deals with the question of alternative 
methods of settling disputes. The parties then have three extrajudicial possibilities 
to settle their differences: conciliation, arbitration and mediation. Mediation is 
codified under Articles 994 to 1005 of the Algerian Code of Civil and 
Administrative Procedures. 
 
It is expected that the judge must in all matters to propose mediation to the parties 
in conflict. If the parties agree to this type of settlement, the judge appoints a 
mediator to hear their point of view and try to bring them together to enable them 
to find a solution to the dispute. Are excluded from the mediation, however, family, 
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labor court and public order cases. The mediation may relate to all or part of the 
litigation30. 
 
The duration of the mediation has been fixed at three months, renewable for the 
same duration, at the request of the mediator and after agreement of the parties 
(Article 996). It is intended that the mediation be entrusted to a natural person or to 
an association. The text has specified conditions for individuals. These must be 
known for their probity and righteousness and meet the following conditions31: 
 
• not to have been convicted of an infamous offense and not to be deprived of 
his civil rights; 
• enjoy the qualification required for the examination of the dispute submitted 
to it; 
• Being impartial and independent. 
 
                                                          
30 Code of Civil and Administrative Procedures (2008), Book V: Alternative methods of dispute 
resolution, chapter II: mediation, Art. 994, p.112 
31 Ibid. Article 998. 
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The executive decree of March 10, 2009 set the terms of appointment of the 
judicial mediator. The mediator is chosen "among the persons who by their social 
position are known by their integrity, competence and ability to handle and settle 
disputes". An annual list of mediators is established by a commission composed of 
the president of the court, the attorney general and the presidents of the courts. He 
is required to take an oath. A mediator not on the list may be called upon, but to 
fulfill his mission he must take an oath. 
 
But these provisions did not make disappear customary law in certain regions of 
Algeria (Kabylie32, M'zab33, etc.). Customary law is the predecessor of mediation 
in the country. In other words, mediation is a tradition and a very old practice 
present in Algerian society. 
 
Indeed, in the tribal areas, the settlement of the conflicts by the village chief is still 
very present. The dispute is settled according to the principles of customary justice, 
                                                          
32 Kabylie region include numerous provinces of Algeria: the whole of both provinces of Tizi 
Ouzou and Bejaia, the majority of Bouira and parts of the provinces of Boumerdes, Jijel, Setif and 
Bordj Bou Arreridj. 
 





following the traditional rules (`urf: us and custom) that define the relations of 
tribal people among themselves, as opposed to Islamic law and state justice. Intra-
tribal and intertribal social relations are marked by permanent tension. The 
customary system is based on three pillars: a compensation system, the mutual 
consent of authorities of regulation and the involvement of the whole clan in the 
settlement of a dispute. 
 
Customary law is a set of practices and written rules that classify and prioritize the 
offenses or infringements committed. While oral transmission of customary law 
remains crucial, some of these rules have been written down. Customary law, 
based essentially on the two tribal concepts of shame and honor, is distinctly 
different from laws derived from religious texts (Islam law). The sanctions 
contained in customary law are aimed first of all at reconciling and restoring the 
honor and dignity of both parties. The punishment is above all a repair. Islamic law 
condemns, for its part, infringements and violations of the norm. 
 
With regard to the prevalence of mediation in the administration of public affairs in 
general, it is interesting to note that the management of social conflicts is an 
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ancient and omnipresent practice in Algerian society. For example, several 
passages mentioning cases of mediation were noted in the Qur'an34. In addition, it 
is also established that in some old cultures (e.g. Berber), mediation as a mode of 
social regulation was widely used in a highly institutionalized form, and occupied a 
prominent place in the animation of community life (strong mediation mind-set). 
 
Under these conditions, Algeria has been able to transpose this method of 
regulation in the field of international relations. Indeed, the generalization of the 
use of mediation in the resolution of international conflicts and its strong presence 
among one of the pillars of its foreign policy can be explained from this angle of 
analysis. 
 
2-3. Mediation a promoter of the national interest and national security  
 
It is obvious that successful attempt by providing mediation in an international 
conflict can directly benefit its initiator because of the honorific impacts:  
                                                          
34 In Algeria, Islam is the religion of the State (Article 2 of the Algerian Constitution of 2016) and 




international prestige, international credibility, brand image, good reputation and so 
on (Allouche 1994, 236). The considerations of political and strategic gains 
surrounding the mediation are fundamentally important for a middle-power 
mediator state like Algeria. Generally, the benefits are tangible. For instance, 
Algeria's involvement in the peace agreement between Ethiopia and Eritrea signed 
on December 12, 2000, facilitated the gradual return of Algeria to the international 
arena and the resumption of its leadership actions on the African continent35, after a 
decade of absence on the international scene. Nevertheless, the gains are sometimes 
purely symbolic and are related to the promotion of international peace and 
security, negotiations in international relations, prevent wars, etc. 
 
Furthermore, the interests of the mediator and those of the parties to the conflict are 
sometimes linked and prove to be decisive for the resolution of the conflict in 
question. The Algerian mediation in the case of Mali conflict illustrates this idea 
perfectly. Algeria has always adopted a security strategy that essentially relies on 
its own resources. This makes it one of the most committed countries in regional 
                                                          
35 Thanks also to: (1) the gradual return of peace and internal stability of the country from the 2000s, 
thanks in particular to a policy of Civil Concord and national reconciliation and, (2) the 
improvement of domestic economy. 
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security. Although it is not involved in the two Libyan and Malian conflicts, the 
effort it provides to protect its borders makes it one of the most committed 
countries in terms of the means mobilized to peacefully settle border conflicts 
including that of Mali crisis. Algeria's strategy is to strengthen cooperation and 
security coordination with its neighbors as an alternative to foreign intervention. 
 
In addition, Algeria has developed a foreign policy to the extent, and several times 
beyond, its means (physical, human and material) to preserve its national 
sovereignty and avoid being engulfed under the influence of other state actors 
significantly more powerful and more aggressive. It is also about reducing its 
dependence on the outside: economic, technological and military dependence. This 
is a question here in particular of avoiding the symptom of "downgrading" the 
country, both from the diplomatic point of view and from the economic side. In this 
situation, preventing the decline of State sovereignty can only be achieved by 








By way of conclusion, the present work has attempted to explain the factors of 
success of the mediation of international conflicts orchestrated by a state of middle 
power: Algeria. To achieve this, I took 4 cases studies in order to be more 
exhaustive in determining the factors of success in Algeria mediations from 1975 
to 2015.  
 
However, if we consider conflict resolution as a major objective of mediation, 
Algeria, which we hear rarely on the international scene, has been able to resolve 
conflicts and succeed where so many other contributors have failed. 
 
However, successful mediation is far from being tied to just one or two factors. In 
the case of Algeria, several factors: political, economic, historical, power and 
influence have given rise to very successful mediations. In addition, every 
mediation has endogenous factors of success depending on the context of the 
mediation process. Sometimes, objective / subjective reasons intervene to 
determine the course of the negotiations. 
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Algeria's foreign policy is focused on pursuing dynamic diplomacy, contributing to 
peace, defending just causes, promoting fraternity, and the development of 
cooperative relations. The impartiality and strict neutrality displayed by Algeria, 
the material and logistical resources allocated to mediations (Algeria has borne, 
incessantly, the financial and logistical cost) and the monitoring of its execution 
also largely explain the success of these mediations. The choice of intervention 
time in some cases is conducive to settlement.  
 
If some authors and experts claim that Algeria has to revisit its foreign policy 
doctrine, I think rather than that, its commitment and the constancy of the 
principles, on which foreign policy is based on, give it certain homogeneity, 
coherence, stability and clarity (unambiguous policy) of the Algeria’s positions on 
international issues.  
 
Very pragmatic approach: respect of the principles of good neighborliness, 
territorial integrity, the inviolability of international borders and non-interference in 
the internal affairs of the two countries, has most probably accelerated the 
rapprochement of the two protagonists. Because of its high-quality political 
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relations with the protagonists to the resolved conflict that raise the level of trust on 
mediator, this factor seems to be the main element of success that could favor a 
victorious mediation for Algeria. 
 
A mediation to gain support for Algerian foreign policy goals:  Algeria sees in a 
successful mediation as a channel to facilitate its gradual return of to the 
international arena and the resumption of its leadership actions on the African 
continent. It is clear that without the settlement of these conflicts by its mediation, 
Algeria will not be able to have significant regional and international visibility 
nowadays. 
 
The very long land borders (around 6400 km) difficult or impossible to cover 
appropriately; the itinerant and transnational nature of the terrorist threat; the 
weakness of some neighboring states; foreign interventions (in Libya and Mali) 
and their destabilizing effects contributing to stimulating terrorist activity; political 
processes (inter-Libyan negotiations) sponsored by Algeria that are struggling to 
succeed in support of national security action; forced Algeria to combine an active 
foreign policy with  its domestic policy. It is a two level strategy: security-military 
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and political (mediation efforts between different protagonists in neighboring 
countries in crisis). 
 
Algeria has also managed to combine these different strategic options (geopolitical, 
economic and financial, military and diplomatic) that are offered to it, in order to 
guide its foreign policy with a certain autonomy compared to the rest of the world, 
and to support its objective of pacific conflicts resolution through mediation. 
 
A legal and cultural framework favoring mediation: The omnipresence of 
mediation in domestic level in Algerian society as a culture, as well, can be seen as 
a foundation for a "learning by doing" approach that is gradually moving towards 
the norms of international mediation. 
 
Also the charisma of President A. Bouteflika (1999 current) as a head of state 
involved in a high level of responsibility in the affairs of the African continent 
since the early 1960s, earned him a continental and international credibility. In fact, 
A. Bouteflika was the youngest African Minister for Foreign Affairs, serving from 
1963 to 1978 (almost 16 years). In that capacity, he presided over the Twenty-ninth 
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General Assembly of the United Nations in 1974, the most glorious time of the 
third world, and the world has retained the image of a militant, among others, 
particularly committed to apartheid, non-aligned countries and G77 developing 
countries. 
 
In general, the secret of Algeria's success lies mainly in its commitment to 
principles, ideals and not to narrow national agendas or egotistic interests. Algeria's 
mediations manage to combine the credibility of its long experience with the 
determination, the will and, the confidence that all parties invest in Algeria. 
 
Finally, the international role of Algeria is, paradoxically, far beyond its means. 
Algeria is a recent sovereign state, but yet endowed with diplomacy with strong 
traditions. Its relative political stability has enabled the generation of young 
militants trained during the war of national liberation (1954−1962) to remain in the 
ranks of the ALN (National Liberation Army) and the FLN (National Liberation 
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ANNEX 1: DEFINITIONS OF TERMS  
 
In order to facilitate a better reading and understanding of this thesis, it is necessary 
to clarify certain terms that can lead to confusion. Indeed, I will define the terms: 
(a) international negotiation; (b) pacific settlement of conflicts; (c) Mediation. My 
objective will therefore not be to discuss the hundreds of definitions that have been 
given of these different terms. It will be indispensable to define the key words.  
 
a. International negotiation 
 
International negotiation is a process of interactions between two or more actors whose 
purpose is to resolve their divergences or conflicts of interest. At least five variables 
involve always in international negotiation: The actors or protagonists; the structure of the 
negotiation; the strategy of each actor; the negotiation process; the results of the 
negotiation (See Merrils 2012). 
 
Negotiation is one of the oldest functions of the diplomatic mission. Diplomatic 
negotiations usually aim at signing international treaties of a bilateral or multilateral nature. 
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But given the complexity of international issues, negotiations are conducted by experts 
belonging to specialized State administrations; such as officials from the Ministries of 
Trade, Labor, Finance, Environment, Energy, Industry, etc (Meerts 2015,). 
 
An embassy also negotiates when it discusses with the receiving State certain matters of 
interest to the two states, for example when it presents a claim, protects the interests of its 
nationals, a non-double taxation agreement, and so on. A political discussion on specific 
issues between the Head of Diplomatic Mission and the Foreign Minister of the host 
country constitutes a negotiation, including a high-level official visit or participation in an 
international conference organized by the receiving State. In fact, it can be said that the 
Embassy negotiates with the authorities of the receiving State whenever it has a matter to 
settle with them. Negotiation takes the form of formal discussions and meetings. 
 
b. The pacific settlement of conflicts 
 
Conflict settlement indicates this ability to generate an agreement, anticipate and 




The UN Charter in its article 2(4) prohibits the use of threat or the use of force. 
Pacific methods of conflict settlement can be classified into various categories. 
Various solutions may be used where the dispute could not be settled by direct 
negotiations between the two States in conflict. Negotiations are conducted 
indirectly by a third party acting as an intermediary to resolve the dispute 
diplomatically. A variety of procedures are used which can be divided into two 
broad categories (Sikander 2011, 161): 
 
In the first type of procedure, it is simply proposed three (3) modes of settlement to 
parties who are not required to accept them: mediation, conciliation or good 
offices. The processes here are characterized by the interposition, with the 
agreement of the parties, of a third party likely to facilitate the solution of the 
conflict, but without the power to make a decision binding on the parties to the 
conflict. 
 
The second type of procedure is characterized by the binding nature of the solution 
provided: arbitration and judicial settlement. The purpose of these proceedings is 
the settlement of disputes by mandatory sentences for the parties, delivered on the 
basis of respect for the law. The arbitration differs from the judicial settlement by 
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the fact that the parties choose the arbitrators, while the judges are appointed by a 
procedure involving either an international organization (IO) or at least a large 
circle of States (International Court of Justice in the framework of the UN, 
European Court of Human Rights attached to the Council of Europe, Tribunal 
United Nations for the former Yugoslavia, United Nations Tribunal for Rwanda). 
 
The use of a particular mode of pacific settlement depends not only on the 
conventions in force between States but also on the nature of the dispute. The 
dispute may be of a legal or political nature. Legal disputes are likely to be settled 
by means of a binding solution for States, in the form of an arbitration settlement or 
a judicial settlement. Political conflicts can instead be handled through mediation, 
conciliation or good offices. The United Nations Charter provides for pacific 
procedures for the settlement of international disputes in its Chapter VI, notably in 
Article 33 (1). 
c. Mediation 
Under this title, the reader should be clarified on the definition of international 
conflict mediation, the conditions for effective mediation and how this conflict 




Mediation or international mediation 36  is a particular form of negotiation; 
characterized by the intervention of a third party or parties to assist, with their 
consent, two or more parties to prevent, manage or settle a conflict by helping them 
to develop an agreement mutually acceptable (Digvijaysinh 2013, 14).  
 
Mediation is useful as soon as there is a blockage between the parties involved in 
the dispute. The mediator's role varies from case to case, ranging from strict 
neutrality to characterized pressure. Far from being systematically impartial, the 
mediator can act as a "communicator" to foster communication and restore trust 
between the parties. The mediator can also suggest as creative as possible formulas 
to reach an agreement. In a third case, the mediator goes as far as to modify the 
power relationships involved by intervening himself in the negotiation (by the 
granting of a financial aid for example). 
 
                                                          
36  For reasons of simplification on this topic, we affirm that our object is not to provoke a 
controversy as to the acceptance or not of the use of the adjective "international", but on the 
contrary to decide. Our position is clear; we will adopt it throughout our thesis interchangeably with 
the terms: “mediation”, “international mediation” and even “diplomatic mediation”, without this 




Many NGOs, such as the Carter Foundation, the Ford Foundation and the 
Sant’Egidio community, have the specific objective of acting as mediators and 
facilitating an agreement between the protagonists of a conflict. For example, 
members of the Sant’Egidio community have contributed to renewing the dialogue 
in Mozambique, Guatemala and the Balkans (Ramsbotham O. and al. 2011, 182). 
 
Mediation has been precisely regulated by the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 
1907 and has been confirmed in the UN Charter on the Pacific Settlement of 
International Disputes chapter (Collier & al. 2009, 28). 
 
Mediation is distinguished from good offices by the greater role of the third State, 
its intervention being more precise, active and more continuous. 
 
Some examples of mediation can be mentioned: the intervention of the USSR in 
the conflict between India and Pakistan in 1965, the Vatican in the territorial 
conflict between Argentina and Chile in 1978-1979. US President Theodore 





It is optional to follow the recommendations of the mediator. But in some cases, it 
can be accompanied by political pressure such as to seriously limit the freedom of 
those who resort to it (United States mediation between Egypt and Israel, 1978-
1979). 
 
Guidelines are set by the UN for an effective mediation37. We summarize them as 
follows: 
 
• Preparedness: Good preparation, all-inclusive inventory of stakeholders, 
detailed analysis of the conflict, adopting flexible strategies, etc. 
• Voluntary consent of the protagonists: the protagonists in the conflict 
should give their consent… 
• Impartiality: Treat all parties in conflict fairly. The mediator must have the 
ability to converse with all parties. 
• Inclusivity: Opening the process to all involved parties, inclusive 
negotiation process… 
                                                          




• National ownership: The warring parties and society as a whole adhere to 
the mediation process and work to implement the resulting agreements and,  
the obligation to adapted the mediation to local cultures and norms, 
• International law and normative frameworks: Mediation can only gain 
legitimacy and the peace agreement in viability in the context of respect for 
international law. 
• Coherence, coordination and complementarities of mediation activities: 
Concerted or coordinated approaches must be adopted and tasks must be 
clearly divided among the actors involved at various levels.  
• Peace agreements of quality: Successful peace agreements must put an 
end to hostility and create the conditions for permanent peace, justice, 









논문 요약  
알제리는 마그레브 지역, 중동과 북아프리카영역 내지는, 아프리카, 서유럽 
지중해 국가 등의 국제 무대에서 핵심적인 역할을 하도록 진화해왔다. 
알제리의 외교는 포괄적인 대화와 화해를 통해 태평양의 위기와 분쟁의 
해결에 항상 수혜를 주어왔다.  본 연구의 목적은 국제 분쟁의 해결을 위한 
중재에 있어서의 알제리의 역할을 분석하고 그 성공 요인을 밝히는 것이다. 
이는 지역 강국으로서의 알제리가 중재, 분쟁 해결, 그리고 국제적 관계에서 
선도적 역할을 하고 있음을 보여줄 수 있다.   
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